If There’s a Growing Epidemic in Depression, How Come the Happiness Data Don’t Show It?
An email exchange with Virginia Postrel prompted me to note for the first time that there’s a real problem in trying to use the happiness data and the depression data at the same time. Almost all the “paradox of prosperity” books cite happiness data that is supposed to show that we’re not getting much, if any, happier as we grow wealthier as a society. Alongside, they cite data purporting to show that depression is approaching epidemic proportions. But the happiness and the depression data contradict each other. You can’t in good conscience appeal to both.
The “paradox” books generally show a graph illustrating the stability of the percentage of people reporting that they are “very happy.” But they could also show a similar graph of the stability of people reporting that they are “not too happy” or “not at all happy” (depending on the survey). For example, Branchflower and Oswald, “Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA,” show that, in the US, the number of folks reporting that they are “not too happy” (on the three option surveu) dropped from 14% in the 1972-1976 period to 12% in the 1994-1998 period (which is up from the 1988-1993 low of 10%). Similarly, in Britain, the number reporting “not at all” and “not very” (on the four option survey) was 4% and 11% respectively in the 1972-1976 period, and 3% and 10% in the 1994-1998 period.
If depression rates have been rising stratospherically, how come the happiness surveys don’t track this fact at all, but instead show a small decline in the number of dissastified people? On its face, it looks like the happiness data contradicts the depression data. Indeed, the happiness data would seem to support the Horwitz-Wakefield hypothesis that the apparent increase in depression is almost entirely a function of the flaccidity of the diagnostic category.
One way of addressing the apparent contradiction, suggested by Virginia in her review of Gregg Easterbrook’s The Progress Paradox, is to point out that depression and unhappiness are very different things. Virginia points to Julian Simon as an example of a happy person who stuggled with depression. It is indeed plausible that some genuinely depressed people, for whom life is otherwise going very well, will experience their depression as an external malady–an alien force unprompted by events–and so will nevertheless report that they are happy.
However, it seems at least as likely that the depression will cast a shadow over life, and negatively effect one’s assessment of how well things are going. Indeed, it is not at all uncommon for depression to cause major problems in precisely those areas most important for the sense that one’s life is going well, such as work and love. So, if there was in fact a huge increase in depression, we should expect at least a significant fraction of those people to show up in the lowest category of self-reported happiness, even if many others are reporting that they are happy despite their depression.
Additionally, if an increasing number of people are simply functionally sad, as opposed to pathologically depressed, due to a death in the family, a bad break-up, or a lost job, you’d think that they’d show up in the happiness data. This is preciesly the sort of thing the happiness data is supposed to be measuring. It does, in fact, pick up the negative hedonic effects of higher employment rates, for example. There simply is no increase in subjective ill-being, as measured by the surveys.
Therefore, if you’re going to use the happiness data to show that we’re not getting happier as incomes rise, you can’t turn around and use dramatic depression data that, if accurate, ought to show up pretty dramatically in happiness data that, on the contrary, suggests a mild decline in the percentage of the depressed and sad. At the very least, you need some explanation of why this profound epidemic of depressive mental illness has, amazingly, absolutely no effect on the data from which you are drawing most of your conclusions.
I’m sort of amazed that this didn’t occur to me earlier. And I’m really amazed by the fact that the apparent inconsistency just doesn’t come up (I don’t think) in the “paradox” books. When you think about it, if there was really a widening plague of depression AND average happiness was stable, then you’d need need a growing cadre of really happy people to offset the growing legions of the depressed. But all the books make a show out of the fact that there isn’t a growing cadre of really happy people, and they all admit the average is stable. So you’d think the “rising depression” idea would raise a red flag or two.
I think it’s pretty clear that the depression data is junk. And that’s trouble for the “paradox” genre. If you’re unable to honestly say that we’re getting more miserable, you’re left with data that show that we’re slightly better off and no worse off than we’ve ever been, since we’ve been measuring this sort of thing, at least. And here’s a pretty hard argument to sell: We’re happy as ever. Therefore, radical interventions are required!
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If There’s a Growing Epidemic in Depression, How Come the Happiness Data Don’t Show It?
[Cross-posted to Happiness and Public Policy] An email exchange with Virginia Postrel prompted me to note for the first time that there’s a real problem in trying to use the happiness data and the depression data at the same time….
I too would incline to the suggestion that the depression data is junk (at least in terms of its ability to track changes over time; it may or may not have other uses).
Two alternative hypothesis do strike me, however. I admit in advance that I have no idea whether they’re even remotely consistent with what people in the know know about depression.
(1) Say, generally, depression causes unhappiness, but what causes depression is otherwise separate from factors influencing happiness. (I guess genetic or biochemical explanations of depression might function in this way?) If these factors move in opposite directions, then a rise in depression could coincide with a flat-line of unhappiness. However, that would both mean (a) that we’re currently underestimating the effect of rising material well-being etc on happiness because we’ve essentially got an omitted variable (depression) that we don’t control for; and (b) that we couldn’t use anything we use to explain happiness to explain the rise in depression.
(2)Alternatively, you might have a model whereby unhappiness + some other factors cause depression. That is, some fraction of people who are unhappy become depressed. It might then be that the conditions that allow unhappiness to turn into depression have somehow changed, and more people who become unhappy now become depressed. Again though, you’d need separate factors from those that cause unhappiness.
What does “intervention” mean here?
Is anyone really arguing that government needs to INTERVENE specifically to increase people’s happiness? This seems like a red herring. The policy changes that most libertarians object to most would not be “interventions” even if the would promote happiness in general.
I can see why you would want government to intervene to relieve misery. And I can see that good public policy is required if people are as happy as can be.
But “intervention” just to promote happiness?
Let’s take the limiting case. Imagine (a) that wealth and status inequality and interpersonal competition did cause unhappiness and (b) that the overall wealth they created do not increase happiness enough to justify that. (Just suppose for the sake of argument.)
Further, imagine that (c) modifying the tax code could decrease inequality and interpersonal competition, thus making people happier. Suppose (d) the costs to overall happiness that come from less wealth still left a net gain to happiness.
Would these changes be “intervention” in any meaningful sense? They are probably more objectionable to right-libertarians than most regulations. But how would such a change be intervention?
To me, the conclusion seems simple:
The rise in depression stems from an increase in diagnoses, not in actual unhappiness.
In the past, if someone was depressed, we’d call him a sad sack and tell him to buck up.
Today, we call him depressed and prescribe some Prozac.
There’s nothing wrong with prescribing antidepressants (unless you’re Tom Cruise), but the fact that we are treating more people for depression these days does not mean that there are any more people that are depressed.
I hereby offer to help everyone who suspects that wealth might be making them less happy by accepting as much of their wealth as they would like to give me.
I realize that it’s a generous offer, and that I’m taking an awful risk; but I’m just that kind of a guy.
Gil: You miss the point. Noone’s saying that wealth is making people less happy, just that’s its not making them more happy (contrary to what is supposedly that received wisdom: that it is).
Also, note that (as Will has discussed) striving to get relatively high wealth may make people less happy… but not as unhappy as they would be if they just accepted having less while others are striving to get more. You may call this a collective action problem of sorts. There are a number of different ways that the causal mechanisms might work here.
It may be even more subtle than this. Could be that having less wealth than others (and striving to avoid this) does not in itself make individuals less happy. But, in general, inequality of wealth makes (some, all, most) people less happy because of other effects that inequality has on society and culture. This is the position that I would be willing to defend and I think that its what a lot of the poeple Will criticizes really have in mind… even if they are not being very careful analytically.
On the actual subject of this thread: I don’t think that being diagnosed with depression of the depression data play that much of a part in most people’s opinions about how happy they and others are. (Their quantitative nature and epidemiological credentials may, however, lead scientific studies of happiness to overrely on them. I think that’s why Will’s especially concerned.) Still, the real limits of those data can explain the discrepancies Will notes. Not that self-reported happiness is the end all be all of happiness studies either.
CORRECTION to final paragraph above: “…being diagnosed with depression OR the depression data…”
If wealth bought happiness, there wouldn’t be such a waiting list at the ashram.
Why isn’t this the solution: Sadness doesn’t equal depression.
If at time T, 30% of people report that they aren’t very happy with their lives, it might be the case that 5% are truly depressed.
Then, at time T+1, the same 30% might report not being happy with their lives, but there might be 10% who have entered full-fledged depression.
Thus, depression would have risen, but the total number of “unhappy” people would be the same.
I have no idea whether that is the case — no idea at all — but it is conceptually possible.
Niels, Yes, it’s conceptually impossible that all the action is going on unmeasured with a category, but I think unlikely.
Here’s a dilemma: Is the problem with depression its negative effect on SWB? If it is, then really depressed people ought to report that they’re worse off than people who are just unhappy but not depressed. And we could answer you question by adding more fine-grained categories, and an increase in depression would lead to bigger numbers in the loewst category. If the problem with depression isn’t its negative effect on SWB, and being depressed and being unhappy are just different modes of being at the same level of SWB, then people who are using SWB as a standard of evaluation need to say why depression, per se, is troubling. If it is just another way of being unhappy, no worse subjectively than other ways of being unhappy, and unhappiness in general is on a slight decline, then why should we care about an increase in depression?
[…] This is just gobsmacking ignorance. The correlation between rate of growth and the number of people reporting themselves to be “very unhappy” is negative. It’s as easy as checking Nationmaster. The data is plain. Wealthier is happier. As I reported in this post on the specious depression statistics, Branchflower and Oswald, “Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA,” show that, in the US, the number of folks reporting that they are “not too happy” (on the three option survey) dropped from 14% in the 1972-1976 period to 12% in the 1994-1998 period (which is up from the 1988-1993 low of 10%). Similarly, in Britain, the number reporting “not at all” and “not very” (on the four option survey) was 4% and 11% respectively in the 1972-1976 period, and 3% and 10% in the 1994-1998 period. So where’s the unhappier? […]
[…] This is just gobsmacking ignorance. The correlation between rate of growth and the number of people reporting themselves to be “very unhappy” is negative. It’s as easy as checking Nationmaster. The data is plain. Wealthier is happier. As I reported in this post on the specious depression statistics, Branchflower and Oswald, “Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA,” show that, in the US, the number of folks reporting that they are “not too happy” (on the three option survey) dropped from 14% in the 1972-1976 period to 12% in the 1994-1998 period (which is up from the 1988-1993 low of 10%). Similarly, in Britain, the number reporting “not at all” and “not very” (on the four option survey) was 4% and 11% respectively in the 1972-1976 period, and 3% and 10% in the 1994-1998 period. So where’s the unhappier? […]
Why is it obvious that we have to throw out the depression data rather than the happiness data?
Empiricist,
Maybe not obvious, but read this, and see what you think:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_158/ai_n8680970
[…] Oswald goes on unreflectively to accept the quality of the survey data, and then gives badly undersupported interpretations of that data in order to reach his desired conclusion. This is a problem given things Oswald has said elsewhere, as we shall see. For now, let me stress, as I’ve pointed out on this blog, the happiness surveys and the depression data prima facie contradict one another. Either this hasn’t occured to Oswald, or it doesn’t bother him, for he jumps, in the usual style, straight from the survey data to the depression data: Using more formal measures of mental health, rates of depression in countries such as the UK have increased. […]
[…] Oswald goes on unreflectively to accept the quality of the survey data, and then gives badly undersupported interpretations of that data in order to reach his desired conclusion. This is a problem given things Oswald has said elsewhere, as we shall see. For now, let me stress, as I’ve pointed out on this blog, the happiness surveys and the depression data prima facie contradict one another. Either this hasn’t occurred to Oswald, or it doesn’t bother him, for he jumps, in the usual style, straight from the survey data to the depression data: Using more formal measures of mental health, rates of depression in countries such as the UK have increased. […]
[…] And millions of people take Vitamin C supplements indicating . . . what? A near-pandemic of scurvy? Again, I’ll point to my depression posts here, and here, my depression op-ed, and the Horwitz and Wakefield essay that got me on this kick. […]
[…] There is of course a debate about whether depression really is rising as much as some statistics suggest. As Will Wilkinson has pointed out, it is not showing in the number of people who are saying that they are ‘unhappy’ in the happiness research. Much of the rise of depression may simply be a reclassification of other states of mind or more honesty. Initiatives like Beyond Blue have reduced some of the stigma attached to mental illness, and presumably encouraged more people to acknowledge that they have a problem. New - and effectively marketed- drugs are almost certainly part of the explanation too, providing a relatively easy chemical fix for those who are feeling down, but one that requires them to visit a doctor and say that they are ‘depressed’. […]